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Introduction 
As the Twenty-First Century begins, public confidence inthe 
judiciary is on the wane. In a poll sponsored by the American Bar 
Association, only thirty-two percent of those responding to questions on 
this subject said that they were extremely confident or very confident in 
judges. 1 During a recent argument of an appeal before a panel of which 
I was a member, a distinguished law professor, arguing that the district 
judge should have recused, said that the public has not much confidence 
' 
in judges anyway. We certainly were grateful for his input, which I am 
sure greatly advanced his client's cause. But lack of confidence in the 
judiciary is surely a serious matter, for the citizenry is well aware that a 
properly functioning, impartial, and ethical judiciary is the sine qua non 
of a just and democratic society. 
' Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 
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It seems clear, however, that at least some of this loss of 
confidence derives from factors over which judges have little or no 
control. These factors include: inadequate judicial resources;2 
procrastination and ineffectiveness of counsel; the expense of litigation; 
restrictions on judicial discretion, such as sentencing guidelines;3 and 
litigants' unrealistic goals as well as their disappointment with the 
outcomes of their litigation. It can also be said that some loss of 
confidence derives from the failure of judges to fully exercise their 
authority when confronted with such matters as inordinate litigation 
delays, discovery abuses, repeated adjournment requests and courtroom 
misbehavior on the part of lawyers and litigants. And, of course, there is 
the loss of confidence that inevitably flows from individual experiences 
or media reports of wrong-headed judgments, illogical decisions, 
disproportionate or disparate sentences, and secret court proceedings and 
settlements. What brings us together for this conference, however, is the 
major cause of the loss of public confidence in the American Judiciary 
- the failure of judges to comply with established professional norms, 
including rules of conduct specifically prescribed. In brief, it is the 
unethical conduct of judges, both on and off the bench, that most 
concerns the citizenry and is principally responsible for the crisis in 
2 
confidence that the judiciary faces in these early years of this new 
millennium. 
The trend toward greater public scrutiny of judicial conduct and 
the increasing demand for judicial accountability have their roots in this 
crisis of confidence. These trends have given rise to the development of 
an ever-expanding industry of public and private institutions and 
individuals devoted variously to: analyzing the governing rules; 
interpreting the rules and suggesting additions and refinements to them; 
opining upon individual cases of alleged judicial misconduct; offering 
advisory opinions; issuing reports and studies; and, where authorized to 
do so, imposing sanctions upon judges for rules violations. Involved in 
this judicial conduct industry, on a full-time or part4ime basis, are law 
professors, journalists, lawyers, citizen court-watchers, judges, and the 
members and staffs of judicial conduct commissions and boards, and of 
various other institutions, including Congress and state legislatures, that 
have, or take, an interest in this area. Their work - your work - is 
critically important in assuring an accountable, respected and impartial 
judiciary. 
But there is a downside to this industry, and that is overzealousness 
in the performance of its work. Too much public scrutiny, too many 
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rules, too many interpretations of rules, conflicting opinions respecting 
specific conduct, picayune concerns, and overregulation impact the 
enterprise of judging in a negative way. Ultimately, such excesses can 
result in timid judges, who continually seek advisory opinions on ethical 
matters, recuse when it is unnecessary to do so and generally look over 
their shoulders to see if they are being fitted up by lawyers for some 
ethical violation or other. Such activities can be a waste of precious 
judicial time.and an unnecessary distraction from the judicial business at 
hand, and may even have an untoward effect on the decision-making 
process itself. These concerns are magnified by unwarranted threats or 
unjustified instigations of disciplinary proceedings. The ultimate 
consequence of all these concerns could very well be the undermining of 
judicial independence. 
Under the heading of picayune concerns, I can only refer to the 
listing of advisory opinions under the title "Issues for New Judges" in 
the Spring 2003 Judicial Conduct Reporter of the American Judicature 
Society Center for Judicial Ethics, a leader in the judicial conduct 
industry.4 These advisory opinions, some apparently given in response 
to specific inquires by judges in different parts of the country to various 
organizations that respond to such inquiries, opine upon gifts that new 
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judges may receive. They say that it is okay to receive a gavel from a 
farmer employer or client, a robe from a bar association, and a reception 
from a judge's former law firm. Also in the okay category are clocks 
and chairs. Now I ask you, should judges be proposing questions of this 
nature? Do judges have such an irrational fear of doing the wrong thing 
as to worry enough about these matters to seek an opinion? Is there a 
real concern that a judge must recuse from all cases involving any 
member of a bar association that presented him with a robe? 
There was a time when recusal under these circumstances would be 
unthinkable. In 1768, Sir William Blackstone wrote: "[I]t is held that 
judges or justices cannot be challenged. For the law will not suppose a 
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to 
administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon 
that presumption and idea."5 Alas, although there is still no written code 
of ethics for English judges, the fallowing rule is now applied in the 
courts of England: "The Court must first ascertain all the circumstances 
which have a bearing on the suggestion that the judge was biased. It 
must then ask whether these circumstances would lead a fair-minded and 
informed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a real 
danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased."6 
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This test, calling for courts to identify the perception of a fair-
minded and informed observer, is, as will later be discussed, a recurring 
theme in recusal cases as well as in other types of cases implicating 
judicial conduct. This should not be a surprising thing, for in modern-
day society, it is perception, rather than reality, that has the greater 
importance. The manipulation or "spinning" of perception has become a 
specialized occupation. Law firms consult with such specialists in an 
effort to advance public understanding and sympathy for their clients' 
causes. It is no wonder that a court was recently constrained to rule on 
the extension of the attorney-client privilege to a public relations 
consultant retained by counsel on the client's behalf.7 So with the 
thought in mind that the overall societal trend is toward the elevation of 
perception over reality, I turn to the trends in the rules and norms 
governing judicial conduct in six discrete areas: (i) getting to the bench; 
(ii) recusal; (iii) courtroom behavior; (iv) off-bench activity; (v) financial 
disclosure; and (vi) competence. 
I. Getting to the Bench 
Although most bar organizations, editorial writers, and other elite 
groups seem to favor appointment over election of judges, the great 
majority of Americans seem to prefer the election route for getting to the 
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bench. Seventy-five percent of those polled in an American Bar 
Association survey last year said that their confidence is greater in 
judges they elect than in judges who are appointed.8 Nearly the same 
proportion saw cause for concern in campaign fundraising for judges, 
and almost two-thirds of the representative group polled said that they 
would be more trusting of judicial candidates unaffiliated with a political 
party.9 In other words, the public seeks an unrealistic purity in the 
election of judges. The public seems to be ahead of the ethical curve on 
electioneering by judges. Six in ten of those polled said that they saw no 
problem with the expression of views by judicial candidates and had no 
fear that such expressions would be indicative of later partiality. 10 
The Supreme Court recently brought itself into line with public 
thinking on this latter point. In Republican Party of Minnesota v. 
White, 11 which I am sure will be the subject of considerable and 
extended discussion at this conference, the Court invalidated the so-
called "Announce Clause" that was part of the Minnesota Code of 
Judicial Conduct. 12 That Clause, promulgated by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court, provided that a candidate for judicial office could not 
"announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues."13 
Seeing First Amendment violations at every turn, the Federal Supreme 
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Court observed that the Announce Clause was not narrowly tailored to 
serve the interests of impartiality14 and was "woefully underinclusive" to 
serve the purpose of "open-mindedness" in the judiciary.15 In her 
concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor famously expressed her distaste 
for judicial elections, setting forth a parade of "horribles" that emanate 
from trusting the people to choose their judges.16 Ironically, she herself 
was once an elected judge. Justice Scalia's opinion for the five-to-four 
majority took special pains to note what it was not deciding, as follows: 
"[T]he Minnesota Code contains a so-called 'pledges or promises' 
clause, which separately prohibits judicial candidates from making 
'pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful and 
impartial performance of the duties of the office ... - a prohibition that 
is not challenged here and on which we express no view."17 
A number of states have adopted a "pledges or promises" clause 
similar to the one adopted by Minnesota. 18 Such clauses are based on a 
1990 Amendment to the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct 
designed to prohibit "statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to 
come before the court."19 In the wake of White, there are sure to be First 
Amendment challenges to these types of provisions also. In a decision 
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issued just a few days after the Minnesota case was handed down, the 
New York Court of Appeals held that the campaign phrase "law and 
order candidate" was not a violation of the pledges or promises 
provision of the New York Rules Governing Judicial Conduct.20 On the 
other side of the coin, the Florida Supreme Court has found an ethics 
violation in the campaign literature of a candidate who claimed the 
universal endorsement of police officers, referred to criminal defendants 
as "thugs" and "punks," and said that she would be supportive of 
victims.21 
Since the extent of permissible regulation of judicial election 
campaign speech remains an open question, it is certain that the canons 
of judicial ethics in this area will be tested as never before. Court 
challenges as well as proposals for rules changes are already in 
progress.22 There are those who say that only voluntary pledges to 
comply with certain standards of campaign conduct will be 
permissible.23 However this all plays out, it now will be extremely 
difficult for judicial candidates to win election if they refuse to announce 
their positions on the issues of the day. They will be under intense 
pressure by the media and by special interest groups to respond to 
specific questions, and they cannot now use judicial ethics codes as an 
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excuse to remain silent. Minnesota v. White will also increase pressure 
upon those who seek judicial office through appointment to state their 
views on subjects that previously were considered taboo. Confirmation 
hearings for judicial nominees in the federal system already are taking 
on a different aspect as United States Senators insist on the disclosure of 
views on a variety of subjeGts and test the "ideology" of the nominees.24 
And although a majority of the population may see a significant 
difference between the announcement rule and the pledges and promises 
rule, a substantial minority in the poll previously mentioned perceived 
that a judicial candidate who announces his or her views will be 
~· committed to those views after taking the bench. 
The financing of judicial elections has also become a topic of great 
interest. As previously noted, the public is rightly concerned about 
judicial fundraising. In recent years, interest groups have expended 
considerable money in pressing for the election of judicial candidates 
they think will favor them from the bench. 25 Although the public desire 
is for restrictions on campaign spending by all who run for office, but 
especially by judges, issues of constitutional magnitude present 
themselves in this regard. A growing trend seems to be in the direction 
of public financing for judicial campaigns. North Carolina recently 
10 
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adopted a Judicial Campaign Reform Act. It provides for nonpartisan 
judicial elections and also for funding for Appellate and Supreme Court 
candidates.26 Consideration of public funding is also said to be under 
way in six other states. 27 The public perception is that judges who raise 
millions of dollars to get elected to the bench cannot be fair and 
impartial when it comes to the interests of their major contributors. The 
required isolation of judges from the identities of their contributors is not 
always secured. 
A disturbing phenomenon in recent times has been the expenditure 
of funds to influence the appointive process. These funds, usually raised 
by special interest groups, are spent on advertisements or mailings to 
those involved in the appointment or confirmation of judges in order to 
exert influence for or against appointments.28 The trend of judicial rules 
of conduct in this area is difficult to predict, but it would seem to be a 
good rule for candidates for appointment to steer clear of any association 
with the interest groups that provide that type of financing. First 
Amendment concerns are implicated here also, and the extent of any 
regulation of this type of conduct is problematic. 
The participation of judges in elections that are not really elections 
at all presents another question involving the ethics of getting to the 
11 
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bench or remaining there. The situation occurs, for example, when one 
political party is so dominant that it cannot be said that there are 
contested elections. The party nominee is often chosen by political 
leaders for political reasons, including ethnic balancing. In New York 
City, where there is an ongoing grand jury investigation into judicial 
corruption, allegations of payoffs to political organizations and party 
leaders for judicial nominations, which are tantamount to election, have 
surfaced.29 Even where direct payoffs are not suspected, political 
contributions by judges and their families have given the public a 
significant negative impression.30 
In Minnesota, another method has been developed to stymie a true 
electoral process. There, it has become the practice for judges to step 
down shortly before the end of their elective terms, thereby enabling 
gubernatorial appointments of new judges who then run as incumbents.31 
The appointment process has become so common that 91 percent of 297 
current trial and appellate judges were initially appointed, and some 
courts have even gone decades without an open seat to be filled initially 
by the voters. 32 As information of this type comes to the attention of the 
public, the trend in judicial conduct rules will be to require judges and 
judicial candidates to take whatever steps are necessary to assure their 
12 
participation only in fair and open judicial elections. The goal, of 
course, is the installation of qualified and competent judges, free of any 
taint that may occur by judicial elections that are merely illusory. 
An interesting way to make sure that judges remain in office for 
their entire terms is found in the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted 
by that state's Supreme Court. That court has concluded that the 
Constitution prohibits judges from holding any other public office 
during the terms for which they were elected to the bench, even if they 
step down from the bench before their elected terms are over.33 Thus, 
the will of the people to elect judges is not thwarted by judges. 
II. Recusal 
Nowhere is a standard for judicial conduct so dependent upon 
public perception as in the rules governing recusal. Henri de Bracton, in 
his thirteenth-century treatise, "The Laws and Customs of England," 
opined: "[T]here is only one reason to recuse - suspicion, which arises 
from many causes."34 Some of the "many causes" for suspicion referred 
to by Bracton are now set forth in various statutes and rules governing 
judicial conduct. 35 Yet, it is not the lawyer or the judge whose suspicion 
is the standard, according to modern day British law and custom.36 It is 
the judge in England, as well as in the United States, who must measure 
13 
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the suspicion of the reasonable man to determine whether to recuse. In 
present day litigation in this country, lawyers often battle fiercely for 
tactical purposes to get judges as well as each other recused from cases. 
In many situations of this nature, recusal either has no basis or makes no 
sense, and much judicial time is occupied with the issue for naught. 
Despite the present practice of Supreme Court Justices in recusing 
without providing an explanation,37 the great Chief Justice, John 
Marshall, recused in an 1804 case and gave an explanation: He said that 
he had "formed a decided opinion on the principal question, while his 
interest was concemed."38 Today, recusal in the federal court system is 
governed by statute, and the rules of recusal in state courts generally are 
similar to the federal statutory provisions. Disqualification, which I use 
interchangeably with recusal, is required of a federal judge who knows 
that her or his spouse "has a financial interest in the subject matter of the 
controversy, or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that 
could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding."39 
Financial interest is defined to mean any ownership of a legal or 
equitable interest, no matter how small.40 And so it has become that a 
judge who owns one one-thousandth of one percent of a publicly traded 
company that is a party must recuse. Now, recusal seems to be required 
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in the case of any parent or subsidiary company of a party.41 A 
"substantial holdings" rule would make more sense, but those who make 
the rules are too much concerned about the "suspicion" referred to by 
Bracton to allow such a rule. I think that the suspicion of the laity is not 
as great as the rulemakers think it is. 
The rules governing recusal often list a number of specific 
situations and relationships that call for disqualification.42 Also 
contained in most rulebooks is a provision similar to the federal recusal 
statute that requires "that any ... judge ... of the United States shall 
disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned."43 This type of provision raises several 
questions: What circumstances should give rise to a question of 
impartiality? When is it reasonable to question impartiality? What tests 
should be applied? One can only refer to prior cases and advisory 
opinions to formulate an answer to these questions. The Supreme Court 
has said that an objective test should be applied, but was not clear, as 
usual, as to how this was to be done.44 I once practiced before a county 
judge who recused in a case because one of the witnesses was a man 
who pumped gas for him at a local gas station. That, of course, was in 
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the day when they actually had people who pumped gas. This was the 
fear of perception run amok. 
The Court also has noted that a judge's "lack of knowledge of a 
disqualifying circumstance may bear on the question of remedy, but it 
does not eliminate the risk that 'his impartiality might reasonably be 
questioned' by other persons."45 Is there any wonder why judges have 
tended to be such "scaredy-cats" when it comes to recusal? Appearance 
concerns have also been raised in cases where judges have held small 
financial interests in companies that have been victims of crime.46 
In one case, a mail fraud sentence was vacated by an appellate 
court because the trial judge held some shares in a bank that had 
announced its intention to merge with the victim bank.47 In another case, 
a defendant in a criminal case accused of looting a bank president's 
estate, sought recusal of a district judge who was acquainted with the 
deceased victim. The appellate court observed that there were less than 
a dozen personal contacts between the judge and the bank president, and 
that there was one letter from the judge to the bank president thanking 
him for supporting his nomination and appointment to the federal 
bench.48 Fortunately, the appellate court determined in that case that 
recusal was not necessary.49 
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Recently, the entire bench of a state supreme court recused and was 
replaced by judges from the state's court of appeals in connection with a 
petition by a member of the state supreme court. 50 The petition 
apparently was filed by the member to secure a writ of prohibition to 
prevent a court of appeals judge from pursuing a judicial ethics 
complaint against her for, of all things, misrepresentations made in 
campaign literature. Why the court did not invoke the Rule of 
Necessity, once invoked by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid recusal 
involving judicial compensation,51 is a mystery. By invoking the Rule of 
Necessity, the judges of the state supreme court, excepting only the 
petitioning judge, could have served. Only last month, an ethics 
complaint was filed against a judge who struck down a national rule 
prohibiting road building in wilderness areas, the complaint being based 
on the judge's extensive interest in the oil and gas industry.52 As the 
judge pointed out, none of the companies included in his financial 
holdings was a party to the lawsuit. 53 Here, too, was presented an 
appearance question, and perhaps the response was somewhat overdone. 
The rules governing judicial conduct that include specific 
situations in which recusal is required are clear enough, but there is a 
large, gray area presented by the "appearance of evil rule." This has 
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provided great grist for the mills of the judicial conduct industry, and 
lawyers and professors can debate at length questions about when a 
reasonable person might, could, or would question a judge's 
impartiality.54 Questions pertaining to disqualification based on prior 
positions, commitments, relationships, and comments will continue to be 
explored on a case-by-case basis. 55 Inconsistency in responses to 
questions such as whether and when a judge must recuse when the 
judge's former attorney appears in a case will no doubt continue as 
well.56 
I make one personal comment on recusal trends. There seems to be 
a trend to recuse law clerks or even their judges in cases involving law 
firms with which the clerks have interviewed for post-clerkship 
positions.57 There is even a stronger move for recusal where the clerk 
has been offered or has accepted a post-clerkship position. I think that 
recusal is insulting to the judge and arises from an overblown perception 
of the importance of law clerks.58 Although clerks are very valuable to 
judges, they provide assistance only and are not involved in the actual 
decision-making. Recusal rules for them only serve to reinforce the 
erroneous perception. 
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Finally, it appears that the presumption against recusal that came 
with the notion of duty to sit has been replaced by the "err on the side of 
caution" rule that counsels recusal in an arguable situation.59 I do not 
think that this trend is a desirable one, for it will lead inevitably to a 
presumption in favor of recusal, with a concomitant burden upon the 
judge to rebut the presumption. 
III. Courtroom Behavior 
When it comes to judicial behavior in the courtroom, the television 
icon Judge Judy is a prime example of the rude, sarcastic, arrogant, 
intemperate, inconsiderate, short-tempered, and downright nasty judge. 
Although she acts in the capacity of a small claims judge or referee who 
deals only with litigants directly in what is essentially a staged setting, 
millions applaud her direct way of getting things done. 60 Her popularity 
is a paradox, because each member of her television audience would 
expect much better courtroom behavior from a judge presiding over a 
case in which he or she was a party. Indeed, the trend has been for 
disciplinary bodies in appellate courts to identify, criticize, and take 
appropriate action in cases of inappropriate courtroom behavior. 
Intemperate remarks by appellate judges themselves have been subject to 
notice and appropriate sanction. 61 
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Here, too, care must be taken lest the judicial conduct industry get 
involved in the micro-management of courtroom behavior. It is only 
extreme behavior that should be targeted. When a judge simply rules 
against or criticizes counsel, there is no basis for the disqualification 
motion that lawyers often make. A judge is entitled to question 
witnesses "to clarify both legal and factual issues and thus minimize 
possible confusion in the jurors' minds."62 The Federal Rules of 
Evidence specifically provide that "[t]he court may interrogate 
witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party."63 The familiar rule is 
that a judge "need not sit like a 'bump on a log' throughout the trial" 
and, in a jury trial, must accept the "active responsibility to insure that 
the issues are clearly presented to the jury."64 
There is a downside for litigants even where judges are acting 
within the bounds of propriety. My father once said to a judge who was 
examining one of his witnesses: "I don't mind if you question my 
witness, but don't lose the case for me." Only questions that imply the 
judge's view of the merits areprohibited.65 Such questions unfairly 
impose the judge's views upon the jury, especially where they cast doubt 
on the credibility of a witness. Without a showing of extra-judicial 
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antagonism, however, judicial rulings alone cannot form the basis for a 
claim of partiality or bias on the part of the judge.66 
On the criminal side, a judge who opines at sentencing that a 
defendant is a "menace to society" and concludes that an extended term 
of imprisonment is warranted by reason of a life devoted to crime, is not 
disqualified from presiding over a later retrial. 67 However, a judge who 
spoke at length at a proceeding following a jury verdict of guilty in a 
murder case, accusing the defense of scurrilous allegations, praising the 
work of the police, and promising to "restore the reputations of those 
accused of misconduct by the defense," was admonished by a judicial 
conduct commission.68 Appellate judges recognize over-the-top 
courtroom conduct when they see it, and have vacated or remanded 
judgments in cases where there have occurred such examples of 
unfairness as extensive cross-examination of a witness by a judge, 
indicating disbelief in his testimony;69 comments indicating to the jury a 
fixed and unfavorable opinion of defendants and their counsel;70 and 
extensive interruption of an opening statement, and frequent suggestions 
that counsel object to witnesses' testimony.71 In one such case, the 
appellate court was constrained to remark that "[t]he comments of the 
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judge as they appear in the record often would have been questionable 
even coming from a prosecuting attomey."72 
The trend is to call judges strictly into account for intemperate 
conduct in the courtroom. It is clear that cursing in the courtroom, 
disrespectful conduct toward litigants, threats of punishment beyond the 
power of a judge to impose, and the bullying of counsel are meeting with 
zero tolerance. 73 This is all to the good. 
Ethical questions for judges are continuing to arise as the result of 
the burgeoning volume of pro se litigation. The courtroom behavior of 
judges toward pro se litigants presents a special dilemma where the 
opposing party is represented by counsel. Although a judge is always 
barred from acting as an attorney for a pro se litigant, there may be some 
duty to level the playing field to avoid a miscarriage of justice at trial. 74 
There are great risks to the appearance of justice when a judge assists a 
pro se litigant to make a case. Opposing counsel and the opposing party 
may think that the judge is showing undue preference. On the other 
hand, the pro se party will be angered if he loses his case and may think 
the judge "threw him in." Boundaries certainly should be established for 
judicial participation, for judges need to be able to point to fixed rules to 
get them off the hook that impales them in pro se litigation cases. 
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Affirmative obligations already have been imposed upon administrative 
law judges in the social security and immigration contexts to fully 
develop the administrative record where parties are unrepresented by 
counsel.75 Can the imposition of such obligations upon courts be far 
behind? 
In recent years, there has been a trend not only to assist but to 
encourage pro se litigation. As a result, the volume of pro se litigation 
has been increasing in the courts of the nation.76 Some courts have 
established booths in the courthouse where pro se litigants can come for 
assistance in starting their lawsuits, and others provide assistance all 
along the line as the suit progresses.77 The American Judicature Society, 
which describes itself as the "leading national resource on pro se 
litigation," has generated several publications analyzing methods for 
helping pro se litigants.78 Whether undertaken by court clerks and 
administrative personnel or judges themselves, the practice of law by a 
court in this manner undermines the traditional notion of an adversarial 
system that includes an impartial interlocutor as an essential component. 
Moreover, a pro se litigant whose case is dismissed after she follows the 
course set by the court will have a skewed view of the judicial process. 
23 
The great majority of pro se litigants are pro se because they are 
poor and cannot afford lawyers. 79 My own solution to stem the rising 
tide of pro se litigation is to require lawyers to represent these indigent 
people without charge. There are a great many lawyers practicing today, 
and each one could yield some of his or her time to assist a few indigent 
clients in simple cases each year. This suggestions harks back to an 
earlier day, when I, and others like me, were ordered by the courts or 
asked by the bar association to represent indigents in criminal or civil 
cases without charge. I was told that this was an obligation that went 
with admission to the bar. The concept that this is involuntary servitude 
in violation of the Constitution is pure hogwash. 80 The representation of 
pro se litigants without charge is an ethical obligation and should be a 
legal requirement for lawyers to fulfill. Otherwise, the judicial ethical 
dilemma will continue as pro se litigation grows ever more voluminous, 
with litigants looking to courts for guidance rather than impartiality. 
A majority of the cases resulting in the removal of judges from the 
bench during the last decade has involved conduct related to the exercise 
of judicial power. 81 Other than misconduct in the courtroom, these cases 
have concerned such matters as wrongful issuance of arrest warrants, 
failure to remit court funds, neglect of administrative duties, abuse of the 
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contempt power, refusal to set appeals bonds, ex parte communications, 
improper issuance of a temporary restraining order, and dismissal of 
criminal charges in willful disregard of the law and without notice to 
prosecutors. 82 There are also the cases of the outright abuse of judicial 
power through criminal conduct such as sexual harassment, theft, 
acceptance of bribes, and the like. 83 But whether criminal or not, the 
abuse of judicial power is judicial misconduct of the most evil kind, for 
it undermines the very foundations of the judicial system. As in the past, 
misconduct in the performance of a judge's duties, or in the exercise of 
his or her powers, will justly bring forth the greatest condemnation and 
sanctions. 
IV. Off-Bench Activity 
Although off-bench misconduct has not given rise to as many 
disciplinary proceedings and sanctions as has misconduct in the 
courtroom and in the exercise of judicial power, 84 it has become an area 
of increasing concern. Certain trends are apparent in the approaches to 
such off-bench conduct as discussion of specific cases, maintenance of 
memberships in various organizations, participation in social and 
charitable activities, acceptance of trips to educational seminars funded 
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by private interest groups, and involvement in the political activities of a 
non-judicial spouse. 
With regard to comments by judges about specific cases, the Code 
of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It simply proscribes 
"public comment on the merits of a pending or impending action" except 
where made in the course of official duties, to explain court procedures 
or as a scholarly presentation made for purposes of legal education.85 
The 1990 ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct is slightly different, as 
it prohibits public comment on a proceeding pending or impending "in 
any court" where the comment "might reasonably be expected to affect 
its outcome or impair its fairness."86 A First Amendment challenge to 
the public comment provision of the New Jersey Canons of Judicial 
Ethics was rejected in the case of a judge who acted as a television 
commentator on various high-profile cases.87 The pertinent New Jersey 
Canon had incorporated the "any court" provision of the ABA Model 
Code. 
The principal thrust of public comment canons has been against 
comments by judges in cases pending before them. In a celebrated case 
of two years ago, because the trial judge had granted secret interviews to 
the press during the course of the trial, the interviews having been 
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granted on condition that they would not be released until final judgment 
had been entered, the appellate court remanded for retrial before a 
different judge altogether. 88 The rule against public comment on 
impending cases has been somewhat more difficult to apply, since it 
deals with expectations. The belief that a case may be filed is sufficient 
to trigger the rule.89 Comment on the great public issues of the day 
would seem to be enjoined, because many such issues invariably end up 
in the courtroom after they have been mashed up by the executive and 
legislative branches of government. 
In any event, unless First Amendment jurisprudence eventually 
dictates otherwise, the rule that squelches all judicial comment on 
pending cases will continue to be enforced. Here again, the basis for the 
rule is the need to guard against the public perception of impartiality and 
bias. But questions needing resolution will arise over what is 
impending, what is encompassed by the exception allowing for 
explanation of courtroom procedures, and what comment is allowed for 
judges through teaching and scholarly writing.90 I would hope that I am 
not in violation when I lecture my law students about the wrong-headed 
Supreme Court reversals of my decisions. Courts and disciplinary 
authorities will continue to have little difficulty in dealing with judges 
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who have used the media to publicly criticize appellate court decisions 
that have remanded their judgments for further proceedings, to respond 
to criticism in a pending case or to comment on a case pending before 
another judge. 
Most codes of judicial conduct, including the Code of Conduct for 
Federal Judges, follow the ABA Model Code provision prohibiting 
"membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, religion, or national origin. "91 Several states 
have added sexual orientation to the list of invidious discrimination 
bases.92 One of those states, California, has exempted non-profit youth 
organizations from the list. As a result of that exemption, judges there 
may participate in the Boy Scouts, which discriminates against 
homosexuals. 93 
Recently, the California Supreme Court declined to withdraw the 
exemption, but added a commentary to the Code as follows: "[A] judge 
should disclose to the parties his or her membership in an organization, 
in any proceeding in which the judge believes the parties or their lawyers 
might consider this membership relevant to the question of 
disqualification, even if the judge concludes there is no actual basis for 
disqualification."94 As noted by some commentators, this is a 
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problematic provision, for it permits applications to disqualify even 
when membership in a specific organization is permitted.95 The 
rationale is stated in the first sentence of the added commentary: 
"[M]embership in certain organizations may have the potential to give 
an appearance of partiality, although membership in the organization 
generally may not be barred."96 The trend has been to tweak these 
"invidious discrimination" provisions in an effort to avoid constitutional 
problems. For example, the new Code of Judicial Conduct promulgated 
by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court includes the following: 
"As long as membership does not violate any other provision of this 
Code, nothing in this Section bars membership in any official United 
States military organization, in any religious organization, or in any 
organization that is in fact and effect an intimate, purely private 
organization."97 This type of specificity should be helpful, because, as 
the ABA commentary points out, the question of invidious 
discrimination is a complex one, and "depends on how the organization 
selects members and other relevant factors, such as that the organization 
is dedicated to the preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of a 
legitimate common interest to its members, or that it is in fact and effect 
an intimate, purely private organization whose membership limitations 
29 
could not be constitutionally prohibited."98 Fortunately, Cynthia Gray 
and the American Judicature Society have provided an excellent paper 
summarizing and analyzing the various invidious discrimination 
canons.99 The trend toward specificity has been greatly assisted by this 
paper, which is very useful as a guide for judges. 
As to the participation of judges in social and charitable events, the 
trend has been toward rather strict enforcement of the rule against 
participation in fundraising events, even though conducted by and for 
worthy charities. The reason for the prohibition is clear: The prestige of 
the judicial office may not be used for the solicitation of funds or for 
other fundraising activities.100 This is not to say that judges cannot be 
involved in charitable organizations. Judges are permitted to participate 
in educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organizations not 
conducted for profit. 101 Judges must take care, however, to avoid 
involvement with organizations that are frequent litigants. 102 
In regard to fundraising, it is of course a matter of great concern 
that those solicited may feel compelled to contribute or hold the 
expectation that they may somehow benefit from contributing to a 
charity in which the judge is interested. However, as an author has 
noted: "[I]t is certainly accurate to say that lawyers or court personnel 
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can be intimidated into contribution by the solicitation of sitting judges, 
[but] it seems less likely that average citizens would feel equally 
compelled, particularly where the format of the solicitation is relatively 
anonymous."103 The rule nevertheless is strictly enforced. A judge of 
my acquaintance was censured some years ago for participating in a "jail 
or bail" charitable fund-raiser, even though he did not personally solicit 
funds. 104 Any advertised appearance of a judge at a fundraising event 
violates the rule, as does the imprint of a judge's name and judicial title 
on a fundraising solicitation letter.105 
As to social events, judges have been allowed to accept ordinary 
social hospitality but are constrained to avoid events that carry the 
appearance of partiality .106 The Canons of Ethics encourage judges to 
participate in the activities of bar associations and other groups 
dedicated to the improvement of justice, and the judge and spouse may 
attend bar functions such as dinners and retreats as guests of bar 
groups.107 The trend has been to encourage judges, within ethical 
constraints, to speak, write, lecture, and teach about the law and the legal 
system. 108 I have long held the view that judges have a positive duty to 
educate and that the duty extends to the education of law students as 
well as of the practicing bar. Judges in the federal system may receive 
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payment, up to certain limits based on their salaries, for teaching, 
although honoraria are disallowed. 109 
Many bar associations take positions on matters of social policy. 
The American Bar Association has taken a number of positions on social 
policy, as has the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, just to 
give two examples. The trend is for judges to maintain their 
memberships in such associations, but to avoid participation in the 
development of controversial public policy positions and to avoid voting 
upon them as well.110 Some judges apparently feel so uneasy about this 
phase of bar association activity that they have resigned from 
membership rather than be associated in any way with policies with 
which they do not agree or which they feel may be tested in their courts. 
A hot issue for federal judges has been the propriety of attendance 
at all-expense-paid seminars sponsored by private interest groups. At 
least one application for recusal on the basis of a judge's attendance at 
such a seminar was rejected.111 Recently, congressional legislation to 
prohibit such attendance has been attached to proposals for pay raises for 
federal judges.112 Despite the support of the Chief Justice and the 
Judicial Conference of the United States for such programs,113 adverse 
publicity about the appearance of partiality will tend to hold down 
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judicial participation in such privately financed activities. At least that is 
the way I see it. It does seem strange, though, that no questions have 
been raised about judges who accept all-expense-paid trips from 
specialty bar associations, such as the one based in New York City, that 
regularly fly judges and their spouses to high-end resorts in such places 
as Hawaii and Mexico under cover of participation in brief panel 
discussions. 
Inevitably, First Amendment challenges to restrictions on the 
political activities of sitting judges not campaigning for their own 
elections will be mounted in the wake of Minnesota v. White. Just as 
inevitably, the rules governing the extent to which a judge may be 
involved in the political activities of a spouse will be subject to First 
Amendment testing. Present rules generally prohibit judges from any 
direct participation in a spouse's political campaign. This includes such 
things as soliciting funds, handing out campaign literature, posting signs, 
soliciting votes, accompanying the spouse to campaign events, or 
driving a car with a spouse's campaign sticker attached. 114 
Some of the rules regarding participation in spousal candidacies 
are downright silly. For example, it appears that New York prohibits a 
judge from contributing to a spouse's political campaign.us There are 
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conflicting opinions about whether funds from a joint bank account can 
be withdrawn by a judge's spouse to be used for political purposes. 116 
Questions have even been raised about a judge's attendance at non-
political events with a candidate spouse, whether a judge's photograph 
may be included in a campaign brochure, and the permissible uses of a 
jointly owned house during a spouse's campaign.117 
While it is true that a spouse's political activities may be perceived 
as reflecting the judge's views, care must be taken so as not to impede 
the political career of a spouse through the overregulation of a judge. 
The rights of a spouse may be affected through the application of rules 
of judicial ethics. When I first became a judge, I acquainted my wife 
with the then-applicable 1972 ABA Model Code, which provided that a 
judge "should encourage members of his [note the archaic "his"] family 
to adhere to the same standards of political conduct that apply to him."118 
My wife, a well-known political activist at that time, responded: 
"Consider me encouraged," and went on to lead some statewide and 
national campaigns. The encouragement to adhere to judicial conduct 
rules now applies only in regard to the judge's own political 
campaign. 119 
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V. Financial Disclosure 
A spouse of a judge may also become involved in issues of judicial 
ethics through the requirement that judges file financial disclosure 
statements. Such requirements exist in almost every state and in the 
federal system. 120 Designed primarily to reveal conflicts of interest, the 
financial statements required are often so detailed and the forms for 
disclosure so cryptic that many judges retain the services of certified 
public accountants to prepare the reports. Indeed, federal judges are 
allowed reimbursements of up to $1000 for such fees. 121 In any event, a 
federal judge is required to disclose financial information concerning his 
or her spouse and dependent children as well as his or her own financial 
information.122 Exempt from disclosure are assets in which the spouse 
has a sole financial interest, and (1) which are not derived from the 
assets or income of the judge; (2) from which the judge does not derive 
or expect any benefit; and (3) of which the judge has no knowledge. 123 
Compliance with the last prong of the exemption provision is almost 
impossible. A similar rule applies to the reporting of liabilities. 124 
Earned income and honoraria received by a spouse must also be 
reported. So must gifts to the spouse, including transportation, lodging, 
food, and entertainment. These items must be reported in the same 
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manner as the judge must report them, except when the spouse receives 
such gifts totally independent of the judge.125 
While no substantial changes in the rules pertaining to financial 
disclosure are on the horizon, the public perception being that what 
judges are up to financially is important to know, at least one 
commentator has objected to the federal disclosure rule provision that 
judges be notified when an application for a copy of a financial report 
has been fulfilled. 126 The objection is grounded in the belief that the 
provision tends "to chill public access" in the case of lawyers or litigants 
who would prefer to access this information anonymously .127 I see little 
validity in this argument and do not know of any lawyer or litigant who 
has been "chilled" by this requirement. One thing the notice provision 
has demonstrated to me, however, is that access is requested in the most 
part by newspapers and other media organizations strictly for gossipy 
purposes. 
The Judicial Conference of the United States recently addressed 
the question of public access to financial disclosure reports by issuing 
detailed regulations pertaining to the release of the reports.128 The 
regulations recognize the security concerns that some judges have, and 
provide that notice must be given to the judge prior to release. 129 They 
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provide that any financial disclosure report that may be publicly 
disseminated after release may be redacted "to prevent public disclosure 
of personal or sensitive information that could endanger the filer 
directly, or indirectly by endangering another, if possessed by a member 
of the public hostile to the filer." 130 Reasons for the redaction sought 
must be given, and the Committee on Financial Disclosure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States is empowered to decide 
questions of redaction after consultation with the Marshal's Service. 131 
In these times of heightened security consciousness, state as well as 
federal authorities will be confronted with the need to balance the 
people's right to know against the need to redact or withhold financial 
disclosure inf orrnation for the protection of judges from specific and 
identifiable threats. 
VI. Competence 
Codes of judicial conduct invariably require judges to be 
competent. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges is typical. It 
states: "A judge should be faithful to and maintain competence in the 
law."132 Competence has various components, including intellectual 
capacity, knowledge of the law, good judgment, understanding of the 
judicial process and of the role of the judge, and diligence. The 
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requirement for judicial diligence is often separately stated in judicial 
ethics codes in such phrases as: "A judge should dispose promptly of the 
business of the court."133 If there is any trend in this area, it is in the 
direction of greater expectations of judicial competence by a citizenry 
that is becoming increasingly knowledgeable about the functioning of 
the legal system. This trend will lead to demands for greater efforts to 
enforce competence requirements. 
Probably the greatest source of frustration for lawyers and litigants 
is the failure of judges to deliver decisions in a timely manner. This 
frustration is all the greater because of the fear that even a request to 
expedite a decision will incur the judge's wrath and produce an 
undesirable result. While the heavy workloads of many judges may 
cause inevitable delays in the issuance of opinions, it is often necessary 
for a judge to prioritize in order for time-sensitive cases to receive early 
attention.134 A few years ago, criminal case overload was so great in one 
United States District Court that it was necessary to place a temporary 
hold on civil cases until the criminal backlog was reduced. Dilatoriness 
and inefficiency, however, can never be countenanced. 135 With respect 
to case processing, time standards and reporting requirements have been 
established in a number of states, as well as in the federal system. 136 The 
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consequences of failure to comply with these standards and requirements 
range from peer pressure to suspension. 137 When I first became a Circuit 
Judge, there was an ongoing discussion about what to do with a district 
judge who was far behind in his work. A senior judge suggested that 
some of the district judge's cases be taken away until the backlog was 
disposed of. I thought that this was a very curious punishment, but the 
senior judge said that he could think of no greater insult. In the United 
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, it is said to 
be the custom to withhold opinion-writing assignments from judges who 
are not current in their work.138 
Competence requires that judges see to the competence and 
diligence of their staffs and those under the judge's administrative 
control.139 It also requires that judges keep abreast of new statutes, new 
Supreme Court precedent, and recent developments in the law of the 
jurisdiction in which he or she serves. More importantly, competence 
requires familiarity with procedural as well as substantive law. Lawyers 
seem to be skeptical about the competence of judges in regard to legal 
knowledge, and often start their arguments with explanations of basic 
law. Apparently, they begin with the assumption that judges know little 
or nothing, an assumption probably instilled in them by law professors. 
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I once stopped an attorney who started his argument by ticking off the 
elements of a contract. I said: "You may proceed to concepts of 
intermediate difficulty and assume that we know the basics." On this 
point, I am put in mind of the barrister who argued before the Court of 
Appeal in London. One of the judges said to the barrister: "I have been 
listening to your argument for half an hour and am none the wiser." The 
barrister answered: "I am aware of that, your Lordship, but I had hoped 
that you would be better informed." 
Knowledge of the law and diligence in its application to the facts 
of the case are not too much to ask of judges. Judges are sometimes 
wrong on the law, but that is why appellate courts exist. However, their 
decisions should reflect their personal attention and involvement in the 
case, and the decisions should be their own. The question recently has 
arisen as to whether a judge's decision is his own in a situation where an 
appellate opinion repeated verbatim large chunks of the brief of one of 
the parties.140 As is frequently the case, academic opinion within the 
judicial conduct industry is divided on this question. Some see no harm 
in the practice; others see it as plagiarism.141 
In my practice days, I considered it a good thing if a judge lifted 
some of my language from a brief. Wholesale lifting probably is 
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questionable. A colleague on the state court during my state trial judge 
days had two rubber stamps - one with the imprint "found" and the 
other with the imprint "not found." He would ask for enumerated 
findings of fact and conclusions of law from both sides and would use 
one stamp or the other in the margin of each item. Appellate courts 
generally have disapproved of this practice. 142 Nevertheless, courts 
generally have been reluctant to reverse for the verbatim adoption of 
prepared findings, especially where the judge has revised them in certain 
respects and thereby has demonstrated his or her own input in the 
decision.143 
It seems to me that the duty of competence includes the duty to 
assist in the selection of those who will serve as competent judges. 
Typically, ethics codes allow judges to "participate in the process of 
judicial selection by cooperating with appointing authorities and 
screening committees seeking names for consideration, and by 
responding to official inquiries concerning a person being considered for 
ajudgeship."144 I see this as an affirmative duty, although it is ordinarily 
not so framed. Close attention should be paid to the opinions of sitting 
judges as to who is competent to join them. Judicial competence is too 
important to be left to committees of lawyers alone to determine. In this 
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regard I quote from the records of the Constitutional Convention as they 
reflect the tongue-in-cheek remarks of Benjamin Franklin during the 
debate of the issue of the proper method of judicial selection: "He then 
in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the 
nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest 
of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice (among 
themselves)."145 
Conclusion 
I conclude with an observation and a suggestion. My observation 
is that judicial malefactors constitute but a very small percentage of the 
American Judiciary at any given time. There are more than 30,000 full 
and part-time judges in the nation.146 In the twenty-one-year period 
between 1980 and the end of 2001, only about 285 were removed from 
office through state disciplinary proceedings.147 It is true that some 
judges during that period resigned, retired, were defeated or did not run 
for reelection, or died before complaints against them were resolved;148 
and that disciplinary sanctions other than removal were imposed in a 
number of cases. Nonetheless, it was the very rare case in which an 
ethical violation was of sufficient magnitude to warrant removal. 
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Although one ethical violation is too many, regardless of the 
penalty imposed, the ethical condition of the judiciary is not as much in 
need of repair as the judicial conduct industry sometimes makes it out to 
be. I referred earlier to the possible effects upon judges of the 
overzealousness of the industry in the performance of its work. The 
same excessive zeal may also affect the citizenry by contributing to an 
unwarranted lack of confidence in the judiciary as a whole. The industry 
should be attentive to this concern. 
My suggestion is for greater transparency in judicial disciplinary 
proceedings. Unsurprisingly, the press has been clamoring for this for 
some time, 149 and I, for one, think it would be a good thing. So do other 
judges. 150 Secrecy is usually not desirable in matters of this kind, and I 
believe that open proceedings would go far toward restoring public 
confidence in the judiciary. Various reasons have been advanced for 
keeping judicial disciplinary proceedings closed. They include: (1) 
shielding complainants and witnesses from retribution and harassment; 
(2) protecting innocent judges from being wrongly accused; (3) 
maintaining confidence in the judicial system by avoiding premature 
disclosures of misconduct; ( 4) encouraging offending judges to resign in 
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place of a formal hearing; and (5) insulating Judicial Conduct 
Commission members from outside pressures. 151 
My rebuttal to these arguments includes the following: (1) 
witnesses in these proceedings need no more protection from retaliation 
and harassment than they need in any other type of judicial proceeding; 
(2) many wrongly accused judges would like it to be known publicly that 
the accusations against them are baseless; (3) public confidence in the 
system is enhanced when the public can follow the accusation, the 
proceedings employed to resolve it, and the ultimate disposition; (4) 
offending judges should not be permitted to have the accusations 
disposed of merely by resigning; and (5) there is no demonstrable need 
to protect carefully-chosen commission members from "outside 
pressure." Indeed, it is interesting to note that some judges in closed-
hearing states have demanded that their hearings be open. 152 
According to recent dispatches, 153 the New Yark Judicial Conduct 
Commission received 1,435 complaints about judges in the year 2002. 
There are nearly 3,500 full and part-time judges in New York. Only 
twenty-eight judges received public discipline of any kind. If all of 
these complaints had all been made public, it would have been clear to 
the citizenry that the vast majority of complaints about judges were 
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made by litigants who simply were unhappy with the outcomes of their 
cases. It would also have been clear that the vast majority of judges 
conform to the highest ethical standards in their judicial service. And it 
would have been clear that the judiciary as a whole well deserves the 
confidence of the public it serves. 
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Q. What happened then? 
A. He told me, he says, "I have to kill you because 
you can identify me." 
Q. Did he kill you? 
A. No. 
Q. Now I am going to show you what has been marked as 
plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and ask if you recognize 
the picture. 
A. John Fletcher. 
Q. That's you? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And you were present when the picture was taken, 
right? 
Q. Now, Mrs. Johnson, how was your first marriage 
terminated? 
A. By death. 
Q. And by whose death was it terminated? 
Q. What is your name? 
A. Ernestine McDowell. 
Q. And what is your marital status? 
A. Fair. 
Q. Are you married? 
A. No, I am divorced. 
Q. What did your husband do before you divorced him? 








Mr. Jones, is your appearance this morning pursuant 
~o a subpoena which was served upon you? 
No. This is how I dress when I go to work. 
And lastly, Gary, all your responses must be oral. 
Okay? What school do you go to? 
Oral. 





Do you have any sort of medical disability? 
Legally blind. 
Does that create substantial problems with your 
eyesight as far as seeing things? 
Q. 
A. 
Are you qualified to give a urine sample? 
Yes, I have been since early childhood. 
Q. Was there some event,. Valerie, that occurred which 
kind of finally made you determined that you had to 
separate from your husband? · 
A. Yes. · · 
Q. What did he do? 
A. Well, uh, he tried to kill me. 
Q. All right. And then you felt that that was the 
last straw, is that correct? 
Q. As you were driving your car just before the 
accident, where was your right foot located? 
A. It was located at the end of my right leg! 
~. ~~ct~'; <;lid' Aou say he !as s~or !~ ;11!1:=!eds'!' 
-• ~-, aid h Was shot 111 th- --~'-~?-J~_on. 
Q. Do you recall approximately the time that you 
examined the body of Mr. Edgington at the 
mortuary? 
A. It was in the evening. The autopsy started 
about 8:30 P.M. 
Q. And Mr. Edgington was dead at that time, is that 
correct? 
stood back and shot Tomm 
out his gun and shot 
Q. Do you.know how far pregnant you are right now? 
A. I will be three months November 8th. 
Q. Apparently then, the date of conception was 
August 8th? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What were you and your husband doing at that time? 
Q. What doctor treated you for the injures you sustained 
While at work? 
A. or. J (name omitted). 
Q. And what kind of physician is Dr. J.? 
A. Well, I'm not sure, but I remember you said he was 
a good plaintiff's doctor. 
Is th ..... '"-' 
A. Yeah. 
Q. Is there 
A. Yeah. 
somebody in the gang called "InsanoJf7 
Q. You don't hapnA.....-~ 
any chanc o you? 
A. Thei ristian names? 
Q. , like Bill, Charlie, you know Fred? 
Perfectly honest, I never knew they was ChrisLrHD 
nn~~e things people acrually said in court, word for word, taken down 
£..,/'"Q: What is your date o 
A: July fifteenth. 
Q: What year? 
A: Every year. 
ymg c m w 1 e these exchanges.were actually taling place. 
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Q: What gear were you in at the moment of the impact? 
A: Gucci sweats and Reeboks. · 
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· myasthenia gravis, does it affect your m at all? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And in what ways does · 
A: I forget. 
orget. Can you give us an example of something that you ve ? 
I ,I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I 1. I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I+++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 
Q: How old is your son, the one living with you? 
A: Thirty-eight or thirty· five. I can't remember which. 
Q: How Jong has he lived with you? 
A: Forty-five years. 
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Q: What was the first thing your husband said to you when he woke that morning? 
A: He said, "Where am I Cathy?" 
Q: And why did that upset you? 
A: My name is Susan. . 
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Q: And where was the location of the accident? 
A: Approximately milepost 499. 
Q: And where is milepost 499? 
A: Probably between milepost 498 and 500. 
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Q: Sir what is your IQ? 
A: Well, I can see pretty well. 
oni Resort Hotel for the sponsorshi of the h · 
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.. 
Q. I understand that you want a new lawyer because your 
present lawyer is not interested in your case, is that 
right? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. Counselor, what do you have to say? 
A. Could you repeat that, Your Honor? I wasn't listening. 
VOIR DIRE 
Q. Can you participate in an endeavor in which the 
ultimate result might be death by lethal injection? 
A. They do that up in Huntsville, don't they? 
Yeah, I guess I could do it if it was on the weekend. 
Can you tell us that you would follow the c s 
· structions regardless of what el pened 
dur1 the course of the · 
A. Cognitive yes. onally, yes. Emotionally, 
effect~v , n't know. Or perhaps effectively, 
rationally, 
Q. Property holder? 
A. Yes, I am, Your Honor. 
Q. Married or single? 
A. Married for twenty years, Your Honor. 
Q. Formed or express an opinion? 
A. Not in twenty years, Your Honor. 
EXPERT WITNESS 
Q. Doctor, what is the meaning of sperm being present? 
A. It indicates intercourse. 
Q. Male sperm? 
A. That is the only kind I know. 
In a murder trial, the defense attorney was cross-examining a 












Before you signed the death certificate, had you 
taken the pulse? 
No. 
Did you listen to the heart? 
No. 
Did you check for breathing? 
No . 
So, when you signed the death certificate, you 
weren't sure the man was dead, were you? 
Well, let me put it this way. The man's brain was 
sitting in a jar on my desk. But I guess it's 
possible he could be out there practicing law somewhere. 
1-C 1RsV ~~Testimony from an Expert Witness 
l 
La1°ffe:r..: Doct:or, as a result of your examination of the 
plaintiff, is the young lady pregnant? 
_r{. 
Witness-:- The young lady is pregnant, but not as a 
result of my examination. 
